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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: A revision (b)(1) of estimated characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet W-class submarines has resulted in a (b)(1) reduction by one third in the estimated range capabilities. This reduced range would preclude W-class submarine wartime operations off US coasts unless the submarines are refueled en route. Of the USSR's submarine force of 413 units, approximately half are W-class types. About 40 Soviet snorkel-equipped submarines of other classes have an operational radius--without refueling--adequate for wartime operations along US coasts. These include 13 units probably equipped to launch surface-to-surface guided missiles. (b)(3)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Belgium-Congo: (b)(1) Secretary General Hammarskjold, (b)(1) who stopped in Brussels yesterday en route to the Congo, intended to take a "very strong line" with the Belgians by asking them to withdraw from their bases and to acquiesce in moving UN troops into Katanga. The Belgian Government is opposed to the UN resolution calling for Belgium's evacuation of Congo bases and hopes by stalling on the issue eventually to be able to retain them. Brussels also hopes to gain sufficient time to strengthen Tshombé in Katanga and to win gradually broader recognition of the Katanga government.) (Page 2) (b)(3)

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Turkey: General Gursel and Colonel Turkes indicated to Ambassador Warren on 24 July that they are determined to go ahead with the forced retirement of many of Turkey's senior military officers even though they would not receive American financial support for the program. The Turks insisted they would "find that money somewhere." While the ambassador warns that he would not be surprised "by any move" Gursel may make, it is not believed that Turkey would approach the USSR for the necessary funds at this time. (b)(3)

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III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee conclusions remain negative. (b)(3)

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

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Operating Range of W-class Submarines Sharply Reduced

A revision of estimates on characteristics and capabilities of the Soviet W-class submarines [redacted] has resulted in a sharp reduction--by one third--in the estimate of range capabilities. This reduced range would preclude wartime operations by W-class submarines off US coasts unless the submarines were refueled en route. The USSR's 223 W-class submarines constitute approximately half of its total submarine force of 413 units. Approximately 40 Soviet snorkel-equipped submarines of other classes have an operating range--without refueling--adequate for wartime operations along US coasts. These include 13 units probably equipped to launch surface-to-surface guided missiles. (b)(1)

Estimated W-class wartime operating radii

	1 day on patrol station	10 days on patrol station
(revised)	2900 n. m.	2500 n. m.
(previous estimate)	4100 n. m.	3700 n. m.

W-class submarines are estimated to be 247 feet long; they have diesel engines, snorkels, and six torpedo tubes which are also suitable for minelaying operations.

From 1950 to 1957, the USSR constructed about 235 W-class submarines in four major shipyards. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] Eight, manned and controlled by Soviet personnel, operate out of the Soviet submarine base in Valona Bay, Albania. The remainder are based in four major Soviet fleet areas. (b)(1)

Communist China, with Soviet assistance, has been constructing W-class submarines since 1955 and has completed about 20. [redacted] (b)(3)

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Belgians Oppose UN Resolution on the Congo

Belgium is opposed to the UN resolution calling for the evacuation of Belgian bases in the Congo and will attempt to stall its implementation. Prime Minister Eyskens has lodged protests with Secretary General Hammarskjold and Under Secretary Bunche against political statements attributed to UN General von Horn regarding the dispatch of UN troops to Katanga and the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo and Belgian bases. Belgian officials maintain that Belgium's right to occupy the Kamina and Kitona military bases was obtained in the friendship treaty signed with the Congo Government.

Brussels hopes that the passage of time will strengthen the position of Premier Tshombé in Katanga and enable him to negotiate with Congolese Premier Lumumba the conditions under which Katanga might rejoin a loosely formed Congo federation.

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On the other hand, reports from the US Embassy in Brussels indicate that the UK is cautioning both Hammarskjold and the Belgians, advising the secretary general to "go slow" regarding the Belgian base issue and Katanga, and warning the Belgians of the dangers their stand on these issues could pose for the UN effort. The French ambassador in Brussels apparently has agreed to approach Hammarskjold in support of the Belgian interpretation of the UN resolution. France continues to justify Belgian troop movements to the Congo and, because of the implications for French bases in West Africa, will probably oppose any effort to force Belgian troops from their bases.

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Turkish Leaders Determined to Implement Compulsory Retirement Program

General Gursel, the interim chief of state, and his adviser Colonel Turkes, in their recent discussion with Ambassador Warren, left no doubt that they intend to go ahead with the compulsory retirement program for senior military officers. Disregarding Warren's suggestion for an "effective moderate plan," they concentrated almost exclusively on the question of the American financial support they had requested for the program. Gursel asked, in effect, "Do we or do we not get the money?" Turkes commented that the funds were needed quickly and "We shall find the money somewhere."

The retirement plan as originally presented to American diplomatic and military representatives in Ankara two weeks ago would result in the compulsory retirement of from 2,000 to 3,000 senior military officers, and could be used by the National Unity Committee to purge the military establishment of potential sources of opposition. Of the 32 generals and 52 colonels and lieutenant colonels retired on 15 July, at least one is known to be a case of compulsory early retirement. (b)(3)

According to Warren, Gursel, (b)(1) (b)(1) could not have been more Turkish in his unyielding attitude nor more provincial in his interest in getting the money requested. The ambassador warns that he would not be surprised at any move Gursel may make. Turkes, who is rumored as a possible replacement for Gursel "some day," apparently showed more emotion and as much determination as Gursel and indicated neither interest in nor understanding of the US position. (b)(1)

The attitude of the Turkish leaders in this matter is further indication of the probable difficulties ahead, both within Turkey and in Turkish-American relations. Although Turkey is not likely to alter its basically pro-Western orientation and alignment, its present leaders will be particularly sensitive in matters involving prestige and sovereignty, and concessions will be granted only after hard bargaining. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)

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